A simple consolidation

Posted by Christie Malry on May 17, 2012 at 11:36 pm

This blog post aims to show a simple, but plausible, consolidation. A consolidation is where a group of companies presents its overall results as if they were a single company.

So, imagine the following situation: P has a single subsidiary S. P is located in a country where the tax rate is 35% and S is located in a country where the tax rate is 25%. S makes a markup of 25% on its sales to P and P makes a markup of 33% on its sales to external customers. In the year we're looking at, S sells $40,000 of goods to P. P has sales of $32,000, leaving it with $16,000 of goods in stock at the year-end.

If P has marketing expenses of $1,000 and admin expenses of $500, and S has R&D costs of $400 and admin expenses of $1,000, and P has interest payable of $2,000, then we get the following consolidation:

  P S Interco sales PURP DT on PURP Consol
Turnover $32,000 $40,000 ($40,000)     $32,000
Cost of sales ($24,000) ($32,000) $40,000 ($3,200)   ($19,200)
Gross profit $8,000 $8,000   ($3,200)   $12,800
R&D $0 ($400)       ($400)
Marketing expenses ($1,000)         ($1,000)
Administration ($500) ($1,000)       ($1,500)
Net profit $6,500 $6,600   ($3,200)   $9,900
Interest ($2,000)         ($2,000)
Profit before tax $4,500 $6,600   ($3,200)   $7,900
Tax - current ($1,575) ($1,650)       ($3,225)
Tax - deferred         $1,120 $1,120
Profit after tax $2,925 $4,950   ($3,200) $1,120 $5,795

A little bit of explanation of the adjusments is needed here. The "Interco sales" adjustment is required to eliminate the sales in S against the cost of sales in P. The PURP ("provision for unrealised profit") adjustment is to remove the profit in inventory on goods purchased from S. This is because, from a group perspective, no profit has been realised. In addition, from a group perspective, this adjustment reduces the carrying value of inventory. But from P's perspective, these goods have a higher tax base, based on the price it paid S for the unsold goods. Therefore in the group books it is necessary to recognise a deferred tax asset for the difference between the group book basis and P's tax basis. This reduces the overall total consolidated tax rate.

You'll see that the group has an effective consolidated tax rate of 26.65% ($2,105 / $7900). This is quite a long way from P's tax rate and only just a bit higher than S's tax rate. But the assumptions we made in creating this scenario are fairly anodyne. Also, we have presumed no other book-tax differences.

Does this look like tax avoidance to you? Does it give you confidence that an informed observer could identify tax avoidance in a similar situation?

I have to say I don't believe it.

 

The ICAEW annual review and AGM 2011

Posted by Christie Malry on May 13, 2012 at 10:30 pm

So, the ICAEW has published its annual review and financial statements for 2011. And, in good time-honoured tradition, that means it's time to take the piss out of them.

WIthout further ado, here are a couple of things that most certainly do not give me confidence

Stop me if you think you've heard this one before

In the inside cover there's some horrific marketing spin that attempts to sum up the ICAEW in a few paragraphs. It's utterly gut-wrenchingly bad:

But, didn't we see this somewhere before?

Let's hope they don't trot this out next year. I, for one, have absolutely no idea what it actually means to "shape opinion, understanding and delivery".

Some girls (and boys) are bigger than others

As ever, it's good to see how the ICAEW treats its staff. And some do rather better than others.

The directors have had a really good year, with an overall increase in earnings on a proforma basis 1 of 5.45% (comprising salary increase of 4.67% and bonus increase of 8.85%).

Embarrassingly for the ICAEW, their own salary survey shows the following:

With the ICAEW survey finding that the average CEO being paid just under £200k, including bonus, how can a tiny and simple not-for-profit organisation like ICAEW possibly justify paying its own CEO nearly two and a half times that?

Generous, eh? Well, not if you're any other member of staff. Excluding employer's social security costs, salaries and pensions were static at £33.1m. But, considering that staff numbers increased from 635 to 675 full-time equivalents, this means on average staff actually took a pay cut of 6% from £52k to £49k. OK, so maybe there are some mix variances in there, but it's still a staggering drop. 

Any of my readers who is attending the AGM might want to ask some questions around this topic.

ICAS hasn't published their financial statements yet, but I'll get round to them when they do.

Notes:

  1. Because Protherough wasn't a director for the whole of 2010, I've presumed that he was for the purposes of calculating the percentage increase, in order to avoid skewing the percentages

Really, Auntie?

Posted by Christie Malry on May 11, 2012 at 10:15 am

Another day, another tax avoidance story:

In the case of GSK, the UK-headquartered firm set up a new company in the tiny European tax haven of Luxembourg in 2009. In 2010, the new subsidiary lent £6.34bn to a GSK company in the UK. In return, the UK company paid nearly £124m in interest back to the Luxembourg subsidiary - effectively removing that money from the UK company's profits. That move meant the money was no longer available to tax in the UK at 28%. In Luxembourg, tax authorities had agreed a generous deal to levy tax on that £124m at effectively less than 0.5%, or just over £300,000. As a result, GSK in the UK potentially avoided up to £34m in UK corporation tax.

The treatment of finance companies has always been a problem for countries. That's why Osborne is looking to change the rules on finance companies, by enticing them with a 5.75% rate.

But this must be bollocks:

The secret tax deals revealed in the documents, first seen by French journalist Edouard Perrin of TV production company Premier Lignes and then shared with the BBC, were all devised by accountancy firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC).

PwC is GSK's auditor. If they really have been flogging them tax schemes on the side, then they've got a lot more to worry about than Ritchie accusing them of aiding and abetting tax avoidance. So I just don't believe it.

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Dual standards at Tax Research UK

Posted by Christie Malry on May 10, 2012 at 11:14 pm

After a chartered accountant gets booted out of membership for stealing from his employer, Ritchie goes on a rant:

But let’s also be clear, chartered accountants have worked in tax havens for decades and as all those places are now beginning to admit, their economies were once based on tax evasion. That may not be true now, although I’ve yet to see evidence that changes my mind,  but how many chartered accountants have faced disciplinary hearing for being engaged in tax haven activity? I suspect the answer is zero

Well, Ritchie happens to believe that the UK is a tax haven. So, shouldn't he turn himself in to be disciplined?

Should he want to do that, the number is 01908 248 250, or he could e-mail complaints@icaew.com.

A very strange idea indeed

Posted by Christie Malry on May 10, 2012 at 10:35 pm

Via Ritchie, we find this:

The government gives up to £40 billion per year in tax [relief] for ISAs, pension contributions, venture capital and property investment, encouraging saving and investments. Yet, there is nothing attached to these subsidies to encourage responsible or sustainable investment.

This report demonstrates how these powerful levers can be used to build a stronger, more sustainable economy. It suggest that policy makers, the public and the financial services industry need to consider and debate seriously a new principle that, in return for tax relief and implicit subsidy, savers and investors should be able to demonstrate a contribution to the public good.

Erm, folks, the public good is the very fact that people are saving in ISAs, pensions, venture capital and property investment. That's it. That's what the government wants to incentivise people to do. And that's why it provides preferential tax treatment for money placed inside such vehicles.

So it's really very strange to ask that there should be strings attached to these "subsidies". The entire point of the subsidies is to encourage us to save, so to attach strings to them would be counter-productive.

And to make this proposal at a time when people are clearly failing to save enough for their own retirement is really quite bonkers.

Ritchie on the teaching of accountancy

Posted by Christie Malry on May 10, 2012 at 10:15 pm

Ian Fraser, a financial journalist, has been interviewing Ritchie:

Richard Murphy believes that the way in which accountancy and economics are currently taught is fundamentally flawed since it is based on a false premise—that markets are perfect and investors rational.

Yeah, only there's a bit of a problem with Ritchie's entire thesis. Actually it's a big problem. A problem so big, you'd expect Fraser to have picked it up himself.

And that's this graph (on p33):

Accountancy courses are mostly irrelevant. It really doesn't matter what they're teaching students of accountancy and economics at university because the majority of accountants become professional accountants having taken degrees in other subjects.

Kinda torpedoes his entire argument, really!

Slapped wrists for Baker Tilly

Posted by Christie Malry on May 10, 2012 at 9:40 am

This is quite interesting, from the AIU report on Baker Tilly:

In 2010 the firm permitted an audit partner to join an audit client as Finance Director within two years of his involvement in the audit ceasing and did not resign from the audit as required by Ethical Standards. A similar case had occurred in 2008. We regard this as a serious matter and referred it to the relevant professional body.

This is a really big deal: the idea is that you want to make it so that the audit engagement partner treats the audit as an external, rigorous examination rather than a job interview. So the cooling off period is a vitally important safeguard.

To ruthlessly butcher Oscar Wilde, to allow one engagement partner to join a client during the cooling off period may be regarded as a misfortune; to allow two looks like carelessness.

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Ungrateful twat of the day

Posted by Christie Malry on May 10, 2012 at 9:15 am

image

On Twitter:

Steven Baxter (stebax): They never show the bit in Secret Millionaire where the benevolent givers write their donations off against tax

One can only hope this is a failed attempt at irony.

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Sometimes Ritchie shoots himself in the foot

Posted by Christie Malry on May 9, 2012 at 10:10 am

Ritchie is having a good old fashioned strop about an article on tax in the Guardian:

Well, let’s look at the tax haven bit – which is wrong

So, what does that offending piece actually say?

4. What is a tax haven?
And why isn't my money sunning itself in one?" Tax havens are usually just small island states that have very few options open to them in order to raise income, so becoming a tax haven is one of them," says Russell. "They are there for anyone to use if they want to. It is a free market and they are just offering a service. The UK is a tax haven itself and we do very well out of it. Most people are not aware of this."

It's hard to see what he's objecting to. Perhaps the classification of the UK as a tax haven? Here's what the PCS Union has to say on that (p5):

The UK's domicile rule, that helps make this country a tax haven, should be abolished.

The author of that report? Richard Murphy, of course!

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Good news on bribery!

Posted by Christie Malry on May 8, 2012 at 11:37 pm

ICAS reports:

Nearly one in four middle managers in the UK believes the Bribery Act is affecting Britain’s competitiveness, according to new figures from Ernst & Young.

Or, as I prefer to phrase it, over 75% of UK middle managers believe the Bribery Act isn't affecting Britain's competitiveness. Isn't that the real story here?