Tax aggressiveness and accounting fraud

Posted by Christie Malry on June 29, 2010 at 10:10 am

 

There's a paper being presented at this year's American Accounting Association annual conference in San Francisco on tax aggressiveness and accounting fraud, written by Clive Lennox (Nanyang Technological University), Petro Lisowsky (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) and Jeffrey Pittman (Memorial University of Newfoundland).

ABSTRACT: There are competing arguments and mixed prior evidence on whether tax aggressive firms are also aggressive in their financial reporting. Our research contributes to resolving this issue by examining the links between aggressive tax planning and the incidence of alleged accounting fraud. After relying on several proxies for tax aggressiveness using effective tax rates and book-tax differences (as well as a common factor extracted from these measures), we generally find that tax aggressive firms are less likely to commit accounting fraud, even when we isolate the 1995-2001 period. However, our results are sensitive to how we measure tax aggressiveness. Consequently, although we mainly find that tax aggressive firms are less likely to fraudulently manipulate their financial statements, we are in a stronger position to conclude that our analysis does not support prior research implying that aggressive financial reporting coincides with aggressive tax reporting.

Full text is also available.  Lisowsky is a bit of a legend in tax/accounting circles for his paper, Inferring U.S. Tax Liability from Financial Statement Information, which used a clever model to derive the tax liability from publicly available information. And this paper may also create waves, given its dramatic findings.  You see, it rather puts to the sword the central hypothesis of the likes of Prem Sikka and Richard Murphy - that companies are all bad and will do their utmost to overstate income and underreport/underpay taxes.  For, the paper finds that companies that are aggressive with their taxes tend not to be aggressive in their financial reporting.

That's the complete opposite of what Sikka/Murphy would claim about companies!

SuperRitchienomics - Ritchie adopts Enron style accounting

Posted by Christie Malry on June 23, 2010 at 10:38 am

Amusing stuff from Ritchie, who seems to be getting ahead of himself.  Under the title "That’s 200,000 jobs in the private sector gone as Bloody Tuesday begins" he shrieks:

The National Housing Federation has predicted that forthcoming housing cuts will lead to the loss (or lack of creation) of 200,000 jobs, and to 350,000 people being added to housing waiting lists. If the housing budget is cut by a third, it predicts that 142,000 new affordable homes will not be built.

Do you see what he's done here?  The NHF has predicted that forthcoming housing cuts will lead to the loss or lack of creation of 200,000 jobs and Ritchie has contorted that into "200,000 jobs in the private sector gone"

Ah, but chartered accountants are alert to this sort of gimmick.  It's Enron-style accounting or, if you prefer, counting your chickens before they're hatched. Only, when Enron did it, merely thinking about a chicken was enough for the company to book billions of dollars worth of eggs.

This is explained by Ross Watts, accounting academic superstar (and one half of legendary double act Watts and Zimmerman), in his paper What has the invisible hand achieved?  He includes a little diagram which shows the operating cycle of a company, from devising an idea, through making inventories, through taking orders, all the way through to shipping the product and receiving payment.  He criticises Enron for recognising profit at the very first stage, when accounting prudence would lead you to recognise profit later in the cycle.  Ritchie wants to cuddle up to Jeff Skilling, it would seem.

Operating cycle

The NHF has made a prediction, which may or may not come true.  Of course, if 200,000 jobs aren't lost, the Ritchies of this world will merely claim that there would have been 200,000 more jobs if only it weren't for those pesky Conservatives.  But even that's not enough.  Blinded by his dribbling hatred of the Conservative coalition, Ritchie's claiming that the jobs have already been lost...  oops!

Obama threatens to remove oil company tax breaks

Posted by Christie Malry on June 4, 2010 at 11:06 am

Via BusinessWeek:

President Barack Obama said the Gulf of Mexico oil spill should send an urgent signal to Congress to complete work on energy legislation, including rolling back “billions of dollars in tax breaks” for oil companies and fostering investments in alternatives to fossil fuels.

Er, so you're asking BP to fund billions of pounds of cleanup work and at the same time you're going to change their tax incentives for the worse?  Doesn't that sound like a profoundly bad idea?

OK, so it's a cheap point.  Then I remembered an interesting paper I read a while back by Calvin Johnson entitled "Accurate and Honest Tax Accounting for Oil and Gas", part of the Tax Shelf project.  Johnson draws on his extensive knowledge of the US tax system to explain how the incentives for oil and gas companies are so generous they distort capital investment decisions by making otherwise loss-making ventures profitable.  So, absent the potentially bad effects on BP in their hour of need, perhaps Obama's plan is actually rather sensible.

ACCA research paper - "The new UK GAAP: how would the numbers look?"

Posted by Christie Malry on May 27, 2010 at 10:24 am

UK GAAP vs IFRS for SMEs ACCAThe ACCA has published a short research paper, "The new UK GAAP: how would the numbers look?", into IFRS for SMEs and how it will change the landscape for SME financial reporting. Currently small businesses mostly report under UK GAAP. However, as UK GAAP moves towards IFRS as a result of the FRC's consultation earlier this year into the future of UK GAAP, and the FRSSE seems to be dragged by the inevitable gravitational pull of IFRS for SMEs, it's a worthwhile question to ask. It focuses on reported profits but also considers how that might flow through into taxable profits.

The report identifies over 50 differences between UK GAAP and IFRS for SMEs, any of which could be significant to an individual company. It points out the main differences that are likely to be the most important in practice.

The report can be downloaded here.

Accounting entrance exams from 130 years ago

Posted by Christie Malry on March 23, 2010 at 4:00 pm

The discussion of whether Latin should be in the curriculum, which extraordinarily upset some people on the left enough that they decided to whine to Bellagerens about it, reminded me of something I'd read about accountancy entrance exams from when the modern accountancy bodies we know and love today were fledgling organisations. But I couldn't remember the source. So I wrote to Malcolm Anderson, who was one of the authors of the fantastic book The Priesthood of Industry about the origins of the accounting profession, and he helpfully gave me some academic references to hunt through.

Eventually I found what I was looking for, in Francis W. Pixley's The profession of a chartered accountant and other lectures, delivered to the Institute of chartered accountants in England and Wales, the Institute of Secretaries, &c., &c (1897). A key strategy of the early forefathers of the profession was to make it as exclusive as possible. Accordingly, the ICAEW's founders made it a virtual requirement that all wannabe chartered accountants had a university degree. But they wanted to be fair to those that did not, so they permitted those seeking articled clerk positions an alternative. They could, instead, sit an academic exam with the following papers (Pixley, p.4):

(1) Writing from Dictation.
(2) Writing a short English Composition.
(3) Arithmetic.
(4) Algebra, to quadratic equations (inclusive).
(5) Euclid (the first four books).
(6) Geography.
(7) History of England.
(8) Latin (elementary).
(9) Any two of the following subjects, one of which, at least, must be a language, to be selected by the candidate:–
     (1) Latin; (2) Greek (ancient); (3) French; (4) German; (5) Italian; (6) Spanish; (7) Higher Mathematics; (8) Physics; (9) Chemistry; (10) Animal Physiology; (11) Zoology; (12) Botany; (13) Electricity, Magnetism, Light and Heat; (14) Geology; (15) Stenography.

In a brief article for Accountancy magazine in July 2007, Anderson notes that this test was designed specifically to keep the riff-raff out. But is it even conceivable that any 18 year old today could pass such a test?

Michael Meacher's Lehmans howlers

Posted by Christie Malry on March 15, 2010 at 8:26 pm

A lot has been written in the blogosphere about Lehmans already. And a lot of it is blathering nonsense. So it's time to start rebutting some of the most flagrant idiocy out there.

We'll start with Michael Meacher MP, who is fuming.

It has just been reported that the Wall Street bank, Lehman Brothers, in its final days in September 2008 set up accounting ‘gimmicks’ which falsely gave the impression that its balance sheet was $50 billions stronger than it actually was. and that the auditors, the UK accountancy firm, Ernst and Young, when alerted to this by the Lehman vice-president, “took virtually no action to investigate”.

This is yet another example – almost daily – of the collapse of accountability in this country. Is Ernst & Youg guilty of negligence or malfeasance? If so, who is taking action to make them liable? $50bn isn’t pocket money.

This is not the first time that auditors have made appalling mistakes or shown extreme culpable negligence. Lehman Brothers had a leverage ratio of more than 30:1, i.e. for every £1 of hareholder funds, it borrowed £30. That means that a mere 3.3% drop in the value of assets wipes out the entire value of equity and makes the company insolvent. Auditors didn’t notice the problem, even though the warning signs were on the front pages of newpapers.

Auditors are supposed to be independent, but they are selected by directors and remunerated by companies. They act as consultants to companies and their directors, collecting huge fees in the process when in fact they’re auditing the transactions they themselves created. They also pick up a lot of insolvency and other work from their bank clients, but these details are kept quiet. Fee dependency encourages silence. The same audit firm can retain its position with a bank or company for years, creating a cosy, lucrative and corrosive relationship with the directors. There is no compulsory re-tendering for the job.

This is a huge public scandal. I intend to campaign via the OFT and other regulators to get this iniquity stopped.

Good grief, where to start?

Firstly, Lehman was not trying to give the impression that its balance sheet was $50 billions (sic) greater than it really was. Under the Repo 105 arrangement, it sold assets worth $52.5 billion and got cash back worth $50 billion. It made its books balance by recognising a derivative for the remaining $2.5 billion. Nowhere was it trying to improve its balance sheet by $50 billion. The benefit was subtler - in improved capital ratios that it could report to the markets.

Secondly, it's a bit rich for a member of the Labour Government, whose current leader pledged "no more boom and bust". If auditors can be criticised, then Gordon Brown must be seriously culpable as well. Unlike auditors, he was in a position to do something meaningful about it.

Auditors might be selected by directors, but their decision is voted on by owners annually. Authority from owners to set their remuneration is also typically sought annually. Auditors are restricted by ethical standards as to the range of services they can sell to companies. For a US-listed company like Lehmans, all services must be pre-approved by the audit committee. It's misleading to say that auditors are minting it in consulting fees. Many of the non-audit services offered, although classified as non-audit services, would be considered essential supplementary services to the audit.

And, to use political parlance, I do not accept that auditors gamble their firm's reputation by undertaking low-quality audits merely so they can rake in fees. That's just ridiculous. Rotation of key partners is helpful - and already required by ethical standards. Compulsory retendering isn't the answer. The Parmalat scandal is evidence enough of that. Further evidence is provided by a 2005 study, which concludes (p.52):

Based on the academic literature collected the present analysis supports the idea that the benefits of the rotation rule are largely doubtful. Moreover most of empirical papers present data contrary to the introduction of this rule. Furthermore an analysis of the empirical studies shows that the evidence doesn’t support the [rotation rule] with regard to [any] of the advocated possible advantages (increase in auditor independence, audit quality, audit market competition and financial market reaction).

Read my lips: auditor rotation doesn't work.

What do you think Meacher has in mind when he talks of "the daily... collapse of accountability in this country"? Uddin refusing to resign or pay back her ill-gotten expenses? Three of his party's MPs using parliamentary privilege to try to avoid having their expenses examined in court? Michael Martin's catalogue of failures as Speaker being rewarded with a peerage? Lord Mandelson's many starts?

Meacher, you are right on one count. We expect accountability. But what we're looking for starts rather closer to home than politicians might like.

Why Ritchie really got banned from Oxford

Posted by Christie Malry on March 11, 2010 at 9:34 pm

Oxford UniversityRitchie tells us all a a sob story about how he doesn't get invited to the high table at Oxford University any more:

Chris Wales - who was instrumental in setting it up - told me that was the case, in person when I was [a]t Oxford two or three years ago before Prof Mike Devereux, the head of the centre, contrary to all UK academic ethics, withdrew my invitation to all events there.

Firstly, contrary to all UK academic ethics? FFS... the Oxford Centre for Business Taxation is a private institution. Richard has no more right to be there than anyone else. It's not as if he's a recognised tax academic.

And the Centre did invite him to their annual conference in 2007. He sat at the back and didn't contribute a bean to the proceedings. Then they found he'd been posting all day on his blog slagging them and their guests off.

So why would they invite such an obnoxious character to their future events? Especially when it's patently clear that he has nothing of value to add to proceedings, other than his trademark rudeness.

ACCA publishes research on the management of tax knowledge

Posted by Christie Malry on March 2, 2010 at 7:35 pm

I got the following from the ACCA today:

A new report, by John Hasseldine, Kevin Holland and Pernill van der Rijt, has been published as ACCA Research Report No. 112.

The report focuses on the process of the management of tax knowledge within companies. Taxation influences operating and financing decisions by the direct imposition of a tax charge and indirectly though associated compliance costs. However, effective tax-knowledge management can allow companies to reduce the adverse effects of taxation. This study of the process involved will be of direct relevance to tax payers, tax practitioners and policy makers.

You can read more about this and other ACCA research here or you can download the full report here.

How to murder the UK pensions system

Posted by Christie Malry on February 24, 2010 at 10:48 pm

Over at Murphy's den, 'Carl' suggests that we tax dividends on distribution.

You could tax dividends upon distribution as a withholding tax. (EU rules are a huge problem, of course, but in principle it would work.) I do not see why this is regressive. In order to get it progressive, the withholding tax would have to be high (50 percent) and reclaimable for low incomes.

We can only hope he means instead of, instead of incremental to, the existing corporation tax. But, given that companies can choose when to distribute, yet can't as easily choose when to make a profit, I suppose he must mean as well as corporation tax.

Carl's idea would have an immediate impact - it would, overnight, stop every single UK company from paying a dividend. Instead, they would force shareholders who want income from their investments to sell portions of their holdings to realise capital gains. This isn't that smart an idea, really, because some people (think pensioners) need income.

I suspect the move would be very bad for the UK pensions system too. Increasing the tax take from UK companies would have a very detrimental effect on those seeking to save for their retirement. This is dumb - we should be making it as easy as possible for people to save, not making it more expensive.

Incidentally, Steven Bank has written an interesting academic paper on the history of double taxation of corporate earnings (i.e. a corporation tax on profits plus tax on dividends in the hands of investors). Rethinking Double Taxation's Role in Dividend Policy: A Historical Approach suggests that corporate managers agreed to double taxation of profits between WW1 and WW2 because it helped them resist calls by shareholders for them to distribute excess cash.

Sikka on transfer pricing

Posted by Christie Malry on February 24, 2010 at 10:13 pm

Prem Sikka has a new working paper out, co-authored with Hugh Willmott. Entitled The Dark Side of Transfer Pricing: It’s Role in Tax Avoidance and Wealth Retentiveness (the apostrophe is Sikka's, not mine), it is full of the usual scary stuff about how bad companies are and how they use transfer pricing to rip us all off.

The article doesn't appear to have been peer-reviewed. In fact, it's such a shoddy piece of work, I doubt whether it would be publishable in any reputable journal.

On page 18, he refers to a paper by Pak and Zdanowicz (executive summary available here), who

provide some instructive examples. Plastic buckets from the Czech Republic have been priced at $972.98 each, fence posts from Canada at $1,853.50 each, a kilo of toilet paper from China for $4,121.81, a litre of apple juice from Israel for $2,052, a ballpoint pen from Trinidad for $8,500, and a pair of tweezers from Japan at $4,896 each. Examples of export prices include a toilet (with bowl and tank) to Hong Kong for $1.75, prefabricated buildings to Trinidad at $1.20 each, bulldozers to Venezuela at $387.83 each, and missile and rocket launchers to Israel for just $52.03 each. For the year 2001 alone, such practices may have deprived the US government of US$53.1 billion of tax revenues

ToiletPak/Zdanowicz is snappy sensationalist stuff, but it's flawed. Let's think about, say, that toilet paper from China. I don't need to defend the price. The flipside of expensive toilet paper means lots of profits in China, which will be taxed in China. Aren't tax advocates supposed to support higher taxes in developing economies? Similarly, products that are exported too cheaply will also lead to higher profits in other countries.

Also, higher import costs means higher import tariffs, which means more money received by US Customs. This is a good thing, right?

Thirdly, Pak/Zdanowicz assume that all avoided taxes would have been taxable. It's a somewhat reasonable assumption, but they still need to do more to prove it.

The upshot of all that is that the purported net cost to the US of $53.1 bn is pretty shaky, and also is offset by a net gain in other poorer parts of the world.

The rest of the paper is taken up with Sikka's usual litany of naughty companies. If you already believe that companies are bad, you'll probably be persuaded. But there's little proof here, just a lot of circumstantial evidence. The very fact that organisations like GlaxoSmithkline and Microsoft have been fined heavy amounts by nation states rather disproves Sikka's earlier line (p.9) that companies are too powerful for our own good. It's a popular line of reasoning, but it's wrong - countries are infinitely more powerful than companies.