The implications for internal control of splitting up the Big 4
Posted by Christie Malry on December 1, 2011 at 8:26 pm
It is a truth universally acknowledged, that corporate blogs are boring, tedious affairs that are best given a wide berth. So it's with some considerable pleasure that I can reveal the exception that proves the rule - Oliver Tant's blog over at the otherwise tiresome KPMG UK blogs.
Today's post is a corker, in which Tant uses the issue of the auditor's responsibility to report weaknesses in internal control to those charged with governance (ISA (UK and Ireland) 265) to highlight possibly unforeseen consequences of forcing the Big 4 to separate their audit practices from their non-audit practices. He argues, convincingly, that such a move will force up costs and may cause internal control problems to be overlooked, if the firm that's responsible for advising on fixing them is different to the firm that first identified them (ie the auditor).
Unfortunately, as ingenious and intelligent as this argument is, I doubt whether it will make much of an impression on Michel Barnier and his team in the Internal Market and Services Directorate General. Specifically:
- Barnier will argue that the increased costs identified are a 'price worth paying' to ensure better audit independence.
- Barnier will argue that the fixing of internal controls, as opposed to the identification of deficiencies in internal controls as a by-product to doing an audit, are indeed a peripheral, non-audit service. And he will be able to claim that allowing other businesses to muscle in on work that previously was dominated by the company's auditors will encourage new firms to innovate and produce even better value-added services for companies. They might even be able to do much more than auditors can over internal controls, other than internal controls over financial reporting. Who can prove him wrong?
There's also a general point, which cuts across almost all of the arguments made by the big firms. They have largely sought to rebut Barnier's leaked proposals by beseeching him to think of the impact on audit quality. But Barnier demands substantial change, in order to address what he perceives as profound structural problems in the audit market. Rather than try and identify specific fixes that might generate marginal improvements, Barnier has decided to rip up the entire audit market and start again. Plaintive appeals to "protect audit quality" are meaningless when Barnier has clearly already bought into the simplistic notion that this market has no quality.
Another line of attack, beyond audit quality, is needed. And fast.





