Prove it, Prem

Posted by Christie Malry on November 10, 2011 at 10:51 pm

Prem Sikka would like to see the tax returns of people who earn above-average incomes:

First, the impulse of wealthy elites and large corporations to opt out of the tax-paying obligation needs to be checked by public scrutiny. As part of this, the tax returns of individuals with above-average annual income should be made publicly available. The tax returns of all UK registered corporations, together with details of tax avoidance schemes, should also be public.

Tax is the price that we pay for democracy, social rights and a civilised society. Our contribution towards that should be a matter of public record. The public availability of tax returns would enable citizens to alert, analyse and inform regulators of dubious practices and demand action.

A professor in accounting who also writes for a national newspaper must surely be earning an above-average income.

So, Prem, if this is such a great idea, why don't you start the ball rolling by publishing your own tax return? 

While you're at it, why not convince your fellow tax campaigner and high earner Richard Murphy to join you on your quest? And see if you can't convince Polly "We are the 1%" Toynbee to take part too?

There's no need to wait for regulation to force you to do it. Show the rest of us how easy it is, and how you have no qualms about making the personal information on your tax return public. Or stop making unreasonable demands of others that you're clearly unwilling to undertake yourself.

The lazy anti-auditor rhetoric must stop

Posted by Christie Malry on November 8, 2011 at 9:19 am

There is a small band of lazy journalists and bloggers who have stumbled across a winning formula (for them, at least): to catalogue every single instance of lax or sub-standard work performed by the Big 4 audit firms and then to sew it into a grand conspiracy about how these firms are systematically attempting to undermine the lives of ordinary people while enriching themselves. You know who these people are.

I have long argued that this style of journalism is lazy and unacceptable, because it fails to take account of the work they perform to a satisfactory level or higher. Such work is almost always performed in private; generally speaking, the only time we ever get to see what auditors have done is when they screw it up.

So there's some bad news for the sloppy crew today:

OLYMPUS changed its auditor because of an argument about accounting for its purchased businesses, rather than it reaching the end of its contractual obligation, according to reports.

The camera-maker, which has seen its share price slump after its new chief executive revealed concerns over advisory payments related to acquisitions, replaced auditor KPMG with Ernst & Young in 2009.

The auditor swap took place because of a re-tendering process following the end of KPMG's contract, Olympus had stated. However, Tsuyoshi Kikukawa, the Olympus chief at the time, allegedly told management there was a disagreement with KPMG over its accounting for goodwill and its acquisition of UK business Gyrus, reported Reuters.

This simply does not fit their narrative. In standing up to Olympus, even apparently at the cost of the ongoing engagement, KPMG's behaviour confounds the Big 4's critics. Their simplistic, naive reporting, from which they make their (in some cases substantial) livelihoods, trivialises a complex situation and gravely insults the many thousands of honest hard-working Big 4 staffers around the globe. In order to provide a credible analysis of the Big 4, it's necessary to account for their quality work as well as their inadequate work. It's time for Frannie, Ritchie, Ian and Prem to grow up, and the Olympus story provides them with a good opportunity to do it.

The eternal and unrivalled idiocy of Prem Sikka

Posted by Christie Malry on January 17, 2011 at 9:14 am

Lordy be.  Prem Sikka's back in the media, and his latest idea, co-authored with Austin Mitchell, is an absolute stinker:

According to the Sunday Times Rich List, the collective wealth of the 1,000 richest people in the United Kingdom rose to £335.5 billion in 2010. This is an increase of 29.9 per cent, or £77.265 billion, since 2009. Despite the deepening recession, this is the biggest-ever annual increase in the wealth of our elite. Fifty-three of the richest 1,000 are billionaires. In 1997, when Labour came to office, the collective wealth of the richest 1,000 stood at £98.99 billion. No other group has received such a massive boost in its wealth. But even if they have all the clothes, mansions, cars, yachts and jets they want, they still can’t spend it all. They came into this world empty-handed. They’ll exit in exactly the same way, but leave behind impoverished citizens and employees when they could easily give 25 per cent, or some £84 billion of their wealth away without hurting the quality of their life. This redistribution would reduce and probably eliminate the need for draconian cuts.

Here's another idea.  Contrary to what the lefties would have you believe, the problem with the deficit isn't caused by a drop in income, it's thanks to Labour's uncontrolled obsession with spending taxpayers' money.  So we should cut state expenditure dramatically.  In order to do this most efficiently, we should quietly murder the 1,000 most needy citizens in order to save a small fortune on their benefit claims.  It's only 1,000 people, so it really won't affect the vast majority of society.  This would reduce and probably eliminate the need for draconian cuts.  And, in any case, we could always keep on killing until the books balance.

OK, so this isn't a serious suggestion.  It's clearly an abhorrent one.  But equally, so is Sikka's.  It's outrageous to steal private property from people merely because the ruling government wasn't able to run its economy properly.  There's no moral basis for the 25% figure. It's just a handy plug that makes the numbers sort of balance. And he overlooks the fact that stealing 25% from the richest billionaires will plug the shortfall only for one year, after which we'll need dramatic tax increases again.  Or perhaps we can steal another 25%? Presuming that they don't flee Britain forever. And who could blame them?

Sikka's articles are dismal enough at the best of times. But this one is totally rancid. It's disingenuous to attempt to perpetuate the idea that there is any sort of pain-free solution to Labour's financial mismanagement. The only way out is to cut spending and raise taxes, while letting inflation take a bit of the pain.  Sikka's solution is an appalling lie. We should expect much better from a professor at a UK university.

Defending audit

Posted by Christie Malry on November 30, 2010 at 10:24 am

Ian Fraser has written an angry article slamming the Big 4 auditors' appearance in front of the House of Lords last week.  Now there's absolutely nothing wrong with writing angry blog posts (if there were, I'd probably have to retire) and Ian is very well worth following on Twitter.  Yet this isn't his finest hour. The hat-tip to Francine McKenna is a giveaway.

So here are the problems with Ian's analysis, as I see it.

Ian's basic argument is that the banks needed a bailout from the government very shortly after their accounts were signed off by their auditors.  The reason the auditors felt able to do this was that they had been told by government that the banks would bail them out if needed; accordingly the banks were considered a going concern.  Ian suggests that this means the auditors have failed in their responsibility to investors.

Now this is a boiled down version of the argument.  As I said, Ian is angry in his post, and the anger does rather get in the way of the coherence of the overall narrative. So I'm sorry if I haven't entirely done his argument justice.

I think the characterisation of the audit firms in his article is a shoddy rewriting of history, with considerable benefit of hindsight.  Back then, nobody had the remotest idea how the economic crisis would pan out.  Indeed, at the time the auditors were signing off the accounts for their clients, government wasn't even admitting publicly that we had a crisis.

That the firms were discussing these issues with audit committees suggests that, contrary to the McKenna/Sikka narrative, auditors had identified the right issues and were taking steps to deal with them.  And we can see that government was worried that, by doing what they have been tasked to do in auditing standards and in regulations, auditors might have made things worse.  So that's why government encouraged them to withhold their going concern qualifications (on the grounds that government would step in) instead of possibly precipitating the crisis by raising the alarm bells.

Technically the assessment that there's no going concern problem if you know government will step in is correct.  McKenna and Fraser might not like that, but it's a valid assessment.  Ordinarily businesses look to banks to cover their borrowing requirements.  A business that can't renew its borrowings will go bust.  But, if government is prepared to stand in, the going concern problem goes away.  Lloyds and RBS are still in operation. It's just they have government support now.

You might disagree with the audit firms for going along with this.  But the audit process is a legal requirement that is governed by legislation and regulations, passed down by government.  When government seeks desperate measures for desperate times, it's reasonable that auditors should yield to those requests.  If we disagree with government's judgement, it's government that should face the music, not the auditors.

Government did some astonishing things at this stage in history.  Brown encouraged Lloyds and HBOS to get together, because he thought it would lead to a better outcome, and he waived competition requirements to allow it to happen.  I thought at the time and I still think that he was wrong to do this.  But, subject to the scrutiny of Parliament and the force of the Courts, he can do it.  Our only weapons are the disapproval of the ballot box and the mighty force of the Courts.

There is a case to answer over what happened. To some extent, Brown has already faced it in that his political reputation is shredded, partly as a result of the other terrible blunders he made while Prime Minister.  He should face further enquiry and scrutiny.  It's right that the auditors should be asked to answer questions too.  But it's not right that they should be excoriated for supporting government when it asked them for their help.

The four stooges wrongly blame auditors again

Posted by Christie Malry on July 1, 2010 at 10:21 am

O frabjous day!  Ritchie gets all triumphant over the FSA/FRC report on audit, observing that the FSA has pointed the finger at auditors, claiming that the profession had not been sceptical enough about the financial firms it audited in the run up to the banking crisis.

He concludes:

What can I add? Except the likes of Prem Sikka, Dennis Howlett, Francine McKenna and I can all say “we told you so”.

Well, you could add that you are a bunch of dupes.  You've been had.

What else did you think the FSA was going to say?  The FSA is an organisation hanging under a death threat - in the Conservative manifesto was a plan to reform financial services, which was a promise to deliver on their earlier plans to abolish the FSA.  So they're clearly going to say whatever it takes to pin the blame on somebody else.

The fact is - the FSA failed. Dismally.  It was the regulator with responsibility for monitoring and reviewing banks.  And it catastrophically failed to prevent the banks from taking excessive risks.  Nor did it do anything to prevent borrowers from overextending themselves on consumer debt, also within its remit.  And now, pathetically, it is trying to say that if only auditors had told it there was a problem earlier, then it might have spotted that it needed to take action.

That's just not good enough.  As regulator, it should do whatever it takes to ensure that it delivers on its objectives, without any excuses.  If auditors really weren't doing their job, then the FSA should have sought additional information from banks.  We can only conclude that the FSA was clueless and inadequate.

The ICAEW's recent report on bank audits notes:

Dialogue between auditors and banking supervisors was not consistently good enough before the crisis, with the regulator not placing sufficient value on such dialogue.

Sorry, Ritchie, but that doesn't look like auditors failing to take their role seriously to me.  It looks like a shambolic, incompetent regulator.

As if more proof were needed, the EC Green Paper on corporate governance in financial institutions states:

Generally speaking, the recent financial crisis revealed the limits of the existing supervision system: in spite of the availability of certain tools enabling them to intervene in the internal governance of financial institutions, not all supervisory authorities, either at national or European level, were able to carry out effective supervision in an environment of financial innovation and rapid change in the business model of financial institutions.

I'm not surprised that the four stooges have fallen into the trap laid for them by the FSA, but I am disappointed in them.  It's simply a lazy and inadequate explanation to pin the blame solely on auditors.  And it's a hypothesis that simply isn't borne out by the facts.

Tax aggressiveness and accounting fraud

Posted by Christie Malry on June 29, 2010 at 10:10 am

 

There's a paper being presented at this year's American Accounting Association annual conference in San Francisco on tax aggressiveness and accounting fraud, written by Clive Lennox (Nanyang Technological University), Petro Lisowsky (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) and Jeffrey Pittman (Memorial University of Newfoundland).

ABSTRACT: There are competing arguments and mixed prior evidence on whether tax aggressive firms are also aggressive in their financial reporting. Our research contributes to resolving this issue by examining the links between aggressive tax planning and the incidence of alleged accounting fraud. After relying on several proxies for tax aggressiveness using effective tax rates and book-tax differences (as well as a common factor extracted from these measures), we generally find that tax aggressive firms are less likely to commit accounting fraud, even when we isolate the 1995-2001 period. However, our results are sensitive to how we measure tax aggressiveness. Consequently, although we mainly find that tax aggressive firms are less likely to fraudulently manipulate their financial statements, we are in a stronger position to conclude that our analysis does not support prior research implying that aggressive financial reporting coincides with aggressive tax reporting.

Full text is also available.  Lisowsky is a bit of a legend in tax/accounting circles for his paper, Inferring U.S. Tax Liability from Financial Statement Information, which used a clever model to derive the tax liability from publicly available information. And this paper may also create waves, given its dramatic findings.  You see, it rather puts to the sword the central hypothesis of the likes of Prem Sikka and Richard Murphy - that companies are all bad and will do their utmost to overstate income and underreport/underpay taxes.  For, the paper finds that companies that are aggressive with their taxes tend not to be aggressive in their financial reporting.

That's the complete opposite of what Sikka/Murphy would claim about companies!

ICAEW report into lessons to be learned from the financial crisis

Posted by Christie Malry on June 16, 2010 at 10:34 am

The ICAEW has published a fuller report into the lessons to be learned for bank audits from the financial crisis.  Following on from its earlier brief paper, this produces more findings and recommendations.

There are recommendations in four key areas:

  • bank reporting
  • auditor reporting
  • dialogue with supervisors
  • support for supervision

The report is mostly concerned with one, fairly intractable question.  Just how do we peer behind the (as Fearnley put it) closed doors where audit decisions are made to help us distinguish between a well-performed audit that happened to be followed by a bad outcome and a lemon?  In that sense, the ICAEW's approach is infinitely more mature and helpful than the Prem Sikka (or even Francine McKenna) agenda, which commits the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.  It's a fallacy that's easy to make, given how uninformative modern audit reports are.  The ICAEW suggests that a way out of this problem is firstly to do a much better job of explaining just what audits are.  But then, the profession should go beyond that and shine some light on the discussions between banks and their auditors.

The ICAEW has some unkind words for the FSA.  It says that the FSA simply didn't place enough value on dialogue with auditors.  This is a gentle way of pointing the finger of blame firmly at the FSA (rightly) for its role in failing to stop the crisis.

Prem Sikka and every accountant's favourite typo

Posted by Christie Malry on April 24, 2010 at 10:32 am

Prem Sikka's bunch of crackpots over at the AABA possibly cause a diplomatic incident with our friends in the AAA:

Prem Sikka fail - American Acocunting Association

Ritchie on audit risk

Posted by Christie Malry on March 29, 2010 at 7:51 pm

Ritchie is fuming that there were no claims made against auditors in the High Court here in the UK in either 2007 or 2008.

Isn’t is staggering that not a single professional negligence claim was brought against auditors in 2007 or 2008? And that just 13 have been brought as a result of the massive collapse of the economy in 2008 - even when auditors gave no clue on concern in going concern warnings?

What does this say? That the balance of risk has shifted far too far in favour of the auditor? That all the nonsense about liability caps is just that? That the balance of power has shifted far too far in favour of the auditopr because it is now almost impossible to sue thjem unless a company has already failed?

All these things, I suggest.

So professional negligence claims are good now, are they? Queue Prem Sikka:

Company auditors, the private police force of capitalism, make millions of pounds in fees from company audits. And company audits are used to get easy access to senior management and sell a variety of consultancy services.

But fee dependence, weak laws and self-interest inevitably compromise impulses for penetrating audits. The inevitable outcome is worthless audit reports.

So, Sikka uses cases of professional negligence to prove that auditors are sloppy and Murphy uses a lack of cases of professional negligence to prove that auditors are sloppy. Clearly they cannot both be right. And, indeed, neither is.

Sikka first. There are thousands of listed companies across the globe. If Sikka is right, the fact that there were no negligence claims in the UK in those years is nothing short of miraculous. Indeed, it should be completely impossible. For his thesis to be credible, it must be capable of being disproved. And two clean years disproves it, totally.

Now Murphy. What do you do when the evidence looks like it's in danger of disproving your life's work? Why, you resort to a "dog that didn't bark" line of argument.

Yet Occam's razor suggests we should accept the simplest solution to a problem in preference to a more complex one. It's totally perverse to try to turn it into evidence of a conspiracy of under-regulation. Because there's no evidence to do otherwise, besides in the demented conspiracy theories of our favourite accounting madmen, we should take a lack of professional negligence claims at face value - that auditors are doing the job that they're there to do.

A brief history of double entry book-keeping #10

Posted by Christie Malry on March 21, 2010 at 10:48 pm

Arthur Andersen advertisementThe final episode of this series looked at fraud. This recognises that accounting, as well as being a force for good can also be used in bad ways.

CM: This was, in my view, a very shoddy and badly put together episode. I will be responding to the issues raised in order to give the balance this episode failed to provide. In the meantime, I have summarised the episode verbatim below.

We have had in the last decade or so some spectacular and notorious frauds. In some cases, there were complex and exotic accounting devices used to mask the scale of the fraud. Only this last week, we have seen reference to Lehmans and their "accounting gimmicks" and questions have been raised of their auditors, Ernst & Young, who may have failed to question their disclosures.

Jenkins interviewed Steve Priddy, Technical Director at the ACCA [CM: I wonder where Helen Brand was, eh]. Were the auditors to blame? Unsurprisingly, Priddy didn't want to comment on the detail. There might be some culpability, but he wouldn't know one way or the other. Jenkins had another go - company auditors are paid millions to do their job, but what did they do in this case? Priddy explained about the audit process. Auditors do some tests to allow them to form a view on truth and fairness, but we must remember that banks are complicated. Even directors don't always understand all transactions, which makes it hard for auditors to stay one step ahead. Meantime, the Lehmans investigations will surely continue.

This is not the first time auditors have got the blame. Enron is the recent case we all remember best. Anne Loft (Lund University, Sweden) said that their auditors, Arthur Andersen, had gotten too close to the company. It was advising companies like Enron how to set up connected companies in which they could hide liabilities while also doing the audit. There were also many former Andersen employees working at Enron.

Prem Sikka is a long-standing critic of the profession. He sees auditors as a weak link in corporate governance. A major flaw is that these big firms both do audits and also advise companies on how to bypass rules and regs and how to flatter their financial statements. They could check these things but have incentives not to do it properly. It's like a game of russian roulette. In his opinion, the recent banking crisis "vindicates" his point of view. He gave a further example: even after Northern Rock had been nationalised, audit firms were still giving clean audit reports to banks. This ought to have been a wake-up call to them.

David Cooper (University of Alberta) suggested that the profession has a short-sighted view of the public interest. Auditors really do try to be independent. But auditors and accountants are brought up with a view that what's good for business is good for society.

After Enron, Andersen collapsed, leaving just the Big 4. Sikka provided some statistics to explain the size of the Big 4. Overall combined turnover is $90bn a year, which would make them a very significant country. They operate all over the world, selling lots of other services.

Cooper also bemoaned how little we know about how they operate. They portray themselves as uber-rational and efficient but they can't live up to this. They sell the model to clients but don't live it themselves. And they promote transparency/accountability but don't disclose much themselves - they don't themselves provide audited financial statements.

Sikka added that even where they do publish accounts (e.g. because they operate through a limited liability partnership) they're very unhelpful. Also, at a company's AGM you are given the chance to appoint the auditor, but are never given any information to help you decide. For example - have they been sued? Have their partners gone to jail? etc... The Big 4 sell the idea of league tables, but there aren't any for performance of accountancy firms.

By contrast, Anne Loft thought it was more or less moving in the right direction. The International Federation of Accountants, which represents most of the major bodies and which sets international auditing standards has a public interest oversight board to watch over it and maintain the public interest.

Prem Sikka thinks more radical action is needed. He advocates a properly designated independent regulator to deliver what the public expects - to open audit firms up to scrutiny. With there now being more liability concessions for firms, it makes it more difficult to sue them. He believes we will see more and more scandals.

Priddy disagrees. The global consensus is that it's not a good idea to have a central regulator; self-regulation is the perceived wisdom. Jenkins asked him if firms are transparent enough. Priddy replied that it's a road we're all on. Firms are evolving. In the UK there are now regular inspections from the national regulator and its inspections are placed in the public domain.

David Cooper said that the information that other users need are still a work in progress. What is the sort of information that corporations might be providing to the general public to help them to hold organisations to account? These are ethical issues. Whose side is the accountant on? We must remain optimistic that we can get beyond obscure information and see what's really there.